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This paper studies the evolution of the market for target-date funds (TDFs) between 1994 and 2009.
We document pronounced heterogeneity in the TDF universe:  TDFs with the same target date have
delivered very different returns because of differences in systematic risk in the stock allocations, and
because of differences in the stock versus bond allocations. This heterogeneity has increased over
time, especially after the passage of the Pension Protection Plan of 2006.  Indeed, we can attribute
the increased heterogeneity in TDFs to the entry of new fund families in the TDF market between
2007 and 2009. These developments in the TDF market are consistent with new entries in the market
adopting a product-differentiation strategy. Our findings suggest that the widespread adoption of TDFs
will not result in returns that are similar across investors enrolled in different 401(k) plans, and that
the current proposals for further disclosure in TDF offerings may have little impact on the incentive
for fund families to offer similar risk profiles.
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In his seminal article, Merton (1971) shows that when an investor faces time-series variation in the
rst and second conditional moments of asset returns, her optimal portfolio is composed of both
a myopic component (the \tangency" portfolio) and an intertemporal component (the \hedging"
demand). As Balduzzi and Lynch (1999), Lynch (2001), and others demonstrate, the time-series
properties of U.S. stock returns are such that a long-term investor should allocate a larger fraction
of her wealth to stocks than a short-term investor. In this case, the hedging demand for equities is
positive and decreases as the investor ages.1 In addition, as Jagannathan and Kocherlachota (1996)
and Cocco et al. (2005) argue, young investors can expect to receive a long stream of bond-like labor
income. As they age, this stream shortens, and the value of their human capital falls. Optimally,
investors should respond to the declining value of their human capital by shifting their nancial
wealth away from stocks and toward bonds.2
In summary, there are good reasons for investors to reduce their equity exposure as they
age. This basic implication from optimal portfolio theory has found its way into the design of
investment products: target-date mutual funds (TDFs).3 Wells Fargo introduced the rst target-
date mutual funds in 1994. According to Seth Harris, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Labor
(DOL), TDFs \were designed to be simple, long-term investment vehicles for individuals with a
specic retirement date in mind."4 For example, investors who planned to retire in 2030 were
1The same implication holds in the static portfolio setting of Barberis (2000), where parameter uncertainty is also
accounted for.
2Bodie et al. (1992) note that individuals may have some ability to change their supply of labor in response to
realized returns on their assets. For most individuals, the degree of labor exibility is likely to diminish over the life
cycle, and this would also lead to more conservative investment behavior as retirement nears.
3Note, though, that some authors have qualied this implication. Benzoni et al. (2007) note that when labor income
and dividends are co-integrated, the pattern of equity holdings over the life-cycle should be hump-shaped, rather than
monotonically decreasing. Pastor and Stambaugh (2011) argue that in the presence of parameter uncertainty and
imperfect predictability, the equity allocation of an optimal TDF should depend not only on the remaining time until
retirement, but also on the initial length of the investor's horizon.
4DOL and SEC Joint Public Hearing on TDFs and Other Similar Investment Options: June 18, 2009.
1encouraged to invest all of their 401(k) assets in the Wells Fargo LifePath 2030 fund. The innovation,
relative to traditional balanced mutual funds, was that target-date funds relieved investors of
the need to make asset allocation decisions: when the target date is far away, the TDF invests
primarily in risky assets, like domestic and foreign equity and, as the number of years to the target
date declines, the TDF automatically reduces its exposure to risk.5 The promise of a simple,
long-term retirement investment prompted the DOL, through the Pension Protection Act of 2006
(PPA), to encourage rms to use TDFs as default investment vehicles in employer-sponsored dened
contribution retirement plans.
In this paper, we study the evolution of the market for TDFs between 1994 and 2009. The
rst objective is to measure heterogeneity in the performance and investment decisions of TDFs.
Since dened contribution retirement plans are likely to oer the TDFs of a single mutual fund
family, we are interested in determining whether TDFs with the same target date are more like
S&P 500 index funds, which oer the same risk exposure across mutual fund families, or more like
traditional balanced funds, which dier in terms of asset allocation, market timing, and security
selection.
We nd that the cross-sectional dispersion in TDF returns is substantial|especially when
we focus on the years immediately after the PPA is passed. For example, in 2009 there were 74
TDFs with target dates of 2015 or 2020. The average annual return was 25:2%, the cross-sectional
standard deviation was 4:3%, and the range (the dierence between the maximum and minimum
return) was 23:5%. Some investors earned an annual return of 35:4% while other investors, investing
in a dierent TDF with the same target date, only earned 12:0%: Turning to asset allocations,
the average allocation to equity was 63:7%, with a standard deviation of 13:6%, and a range
5The formula used to determine how a target-date fund's asset allocation changes as the number of years to the
target date declines is known as the \glide path." Target-date funds are also referred to as lifecycle funds.
2of 69:8%. We nd a similarly substantial dispersion in equity market exposures: the average
\CAPM" beta was 0:75, the cross-sectional standard deviation was 0:11, and the range was 0:49.
Our ndings demonstrate that TDFs with similar target dates can follow signicantly dierent
investment strategies. If regulators assumed that TDFs with the same target date would provide
investors with similar exposure to risk, the assumption is questionable.
The second objective of the study is to quantify the impact of the Pension Protection Act of
2006 on the market for TDFs. By creating an incentive for rms to use TDFs as default investments,
the PPA increased demand for TDFs. Consequently, the PPA created an incentive for mutual fund
families to introduce TDFs. Between 2006 and 2009, assets under management in TDFs more than
doubled, increasing from $110.5 billion to $245.4 billion, and the number of mutual funds oering
TDFs jumped from 27 to 44.
We ask whether the increased volatility in TDF returns following the passage of the PPA
reects the incentive for new entrants to dierentiate their TDFs from established TDFs. We nd
robust evidence that the answer is yes. When we relate the cross-sectional dispersion of monthly
returns to fund characteristics, we nd that mutual fund families that enter the market for TDFs
after 2006 oer funds whose returns dier markedly from their peers. The monthly returns on these
new funds dier from the average monthly return of other funds with the same target date by 75
to 78 basis points (approximately 9% annually).
The patterns that we document are consistent with Carpenter and Nakamoto's (1989) dis-
cussion of eective marketing strategies in the presence of rst-movers or \pioneers." They argue
that \me-too" strategies, strategies close to those of the pioneers, are unlikely to succeed if the
ideal attribute combination|in our setting, the asset allocation and security selection of a TDF|
is ambiguous. Instead, new entrants should segment the market by oering dierentiated products.
3Consistent with their prediction, we nd strong evidence that competition for TDF investors drives
heterogeneity in TDF investment behavior and performance. Importantly, this heterogeneity un-
dermines the assumption that investors only need to know their target retirement date to pick an
appropriate long-term retirement investment vehicle|an assumption underlying the use of target-
date funds as default investment vehicles.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some institutional
background on the market for TDFs and a brief review of the related literature. Section 3 describes
the data used in the study. Section 4 documents cross-sectional dierences in annual returns, CAPM
betas, and asset allocation. It also describes the regressions used to further investigate the sources
of the cross-sectional dispersion of returns. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional background and review of the literature
Although target-date funds (TDFs) were virtually nonexistent 10 years ago, the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 (PPA) created an incentive for rms to make TDFs the default investment option within
401(k) retirement plans. The regulatory goal was to direct investors who might otherwise have
been defaulted (and stayed) into money market funds into age-appropriate, long-term investment
vehicles.7 To accomplish this goal, the PPA relieves plan sponsors of liability for market losses
when they default employees into a Qualied Default Investment Alternative (QDIA). The set of
QDIAs is limited to TDFs, balanced funds, and managed accounts. While TDFs were perceived
6Our ndings are also relevant to the issue of obfuscation in retail nancial markets as discussed by Carlin (2009)
and Carlin and Manso (2011). To the extent that investors assume that TDFs with the same target date are close
substitutes, we can view the deviation of a TDF's return from the average return of TDFs with the same target date
as a measure of obfuscation of the properties of a TDF as a nancial product. Under this interpretation, our ndings
show that increased competition leads to more obfuscation overall, and, in particular, on the part of the new entrants
in the market.
7The tendency of investors to stick to their default investment allocation (i.e., inertia), has been documented by
Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sund en (2003), among others.
4to be an important innovation in the market for retirement products, commentators have recently
expressed concerns about the lack of transparency regarding risk.8
The Investment Company Institute reports that the share of 401(k) plans oering target
date funds increased from 57% in 2006 to 77% in 2009. Similarly, the share of 401(k) plan par-
ticipants oered target date funds increased from 62% to 71%. At year-end 2009, 33% of 401(k)
participants held at least some plan assets in TDFs, up from 19% at year-end 2006. More im-
portantly, while TDFs account for 4% of total retirement assets in 2009, the Financial Research
Corporation forecasts that they will account for more than 10% of the market by 2015, and that
their market share will continue to rise.9 It is conceivable that employees just entering the labor
force will nance their retirement through a combination of TDF returns and Social Security bene-
ts. Because the PPA eectively directs investors toward TDFs, we believe it is important to study
the impact of this legislation on these emerging investment vehicles.
Interestingly, the two current leaders in the market for TDFs take very dierent approaches
to the design of their products. Vanguard's approach is to allocate investments across ve low cost
index funds. Fidelity's approach, on the other hand, is to allocate investments across as many as
27 actively managed mutual funds. Whether one approach is better for investors than the other
is an open question, but the two approaches highlight a signicant source of heterogeneity in how
TDFs are constructed. At a minimum, Fidelity's approach may make it harder for investors to
infer the TDFs broad allocations to domestic equity, international equity, and debt.
This is the rst paper to focus on the heterogeneity of TDFs and to study the impact
of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 on the characteristics of TDFs. The existing literature
8The Appendix presents a detailed description of the PPA together with a selection of quotes on the pros and
cons of TDFs.
9The forecast comes from the Financial Research Corporation's study \Rethinking Lifecycle Funds," released on
May 20, 2010.
5primarily compares TDFs to other investment vehicles.10 The paper most closely related to our
own is Sandhya (2010), who compares TDFs to balanced funds oered within the same mutual
fund family. While Sandhya (2010) focuses on average dierences in fund expenses and returns,
our paper focuses on variation in TDF investment performance and decisions, with particular
interest in variation arising from the PPA. In addition, our sample includes all TDFs, not just
those belonging to families that also oer balanced funds.11
3 Data
We obtain data on mutual fund names, characteristics, fees, and monthly returns from the CRSP
Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database. CRSP does not distinguish TDFs from other types
of mutual funds, but they are easily identied by the target retirement year in the fund name (e.g.,
AllianceBernstein 2030 Retirement Strategy). Through much of the paper, our unit of observation
is family i's mutual fund with target date j in month t. For example, T. Rowe Price oers ten
distinct TDFs in December 2009, with target dates of 2005, 2010, ..., 2045, and 2050. As with
other types of mutual funds, many TDFs oer multiple share classes. To calculate a fund's size,
we sum the assets under management at the beginning of month t across all of its share classes.
To calculate a fund's expense ratio, we weight each share class's expense ratio by its assets under
management at the beginning of the month.12 To calculate a fund's age, we use the number of
10Yamaguchi et al. (2007), Park and VanDerhei (2008), Park (2009), and Mitchell et al. (2009) study investor
demand for the particular TDFs introduced into their samples of dened contribution retirement plans. Shiller
(2008), Gomes et al. (2008), and Viceira (2009) use simulations and calibrated lifecycle models to compare the
properties of representative TDFs to those of other investment vehicles.
11Also relevant to our study is Pang and Warshawsky (2009), who study the eect of heterogeneity in glide paths
on the distribution of terminal wealth. Note, though, that their simulation analysis assumes that dierent TDFs
invest in the same three assets. Hence, their study abstracts from other sources of heterogeneity in TDF returns,
such as heterogeneity in betas and the presence of alphas and idiosyncratic risk.
12Note that because expense ratios for TDFs do not reect the expense ratios of underlying mutual fund investments,
they oer an incomplete measure of total investor expenses.
6months since its oldest share class was introduced. To identify families that enter the market after
December 31, 2006, we use the year when each mutual fund family oered its rst TDF.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the evolution of the TDF market over the 1994{
2009 period. Wells Fargo introduced the rst TDFs in 1994. Between 1994 and 2009, the number
of TDFs grew from 5 to 298 and the number of mutual fund families oering TDFs grew from
one to 44, with total assets under management going from $278 million to $245 billion, almost a
one-thousand-fold increase. In particular, 17 families entered the market between 2006 and 2009,
allowing us to study dierences between older and newer TDFs, and between fund families that
are older and newer to the TDF market. While Wells Fargo was the market leader until 1997,
Fidelity took the lead in 1998. Fidelity's dominant position has been eroded, though, dropping
from a maximum market share of 88:1% in 2002, to 39:6% in 2009. In 2009, the number of families
oering funds with a particular target date ranges from two families for the 2000 target date to 38
families each for the 2020, 2030, and 2040 target dates.
We also use the CRSP mutual fund database to construct a sample of traditional (non-
TDF) balanced funds and a sample of S&P 500 index funds. To obtain our sample of traditional
balanced funds, we dropped all of the funds that we identify as being TDFs, and then restrict the
sample to funds where the Lipper objective (as reported in CRSP) is \Balanced Fund." To obtain
our sample of S&P 500 index funds, we rst require that the fund name include \S&P" or \500."
Then, we manually drop funds that are not traditional S&P 500 index funds (e.g., the Direxion
Funds S&P 500 Bear 2.5x Fund).
74 Empirical analysis
4.1 Characterizing the cross-sectional heterogeneity in TDFs
We start by characterizing the cross-sectional heterogeneity in TDFs. Namely, for each year and
target date, we compute the cross-sectional dispersion in returns, reported allocations to equity,
and CAPM betas.
4.1.1 Cross-sectional dispersion of TDF returns
Table 2 documents the cross-sectional dispersion in realized annual returns of TDFs during our
sample period.13 In order to increase the size of the cross-section for each year, we combine TDFs
with adjacent target dates (e.g., 2015 and 2020). The table reveals an upward trend in the cross-
sectional dispersion of returns. For example, for the 2015{2020 sample, the cross-sectional standard
deviation increases from 0:5% in 2000 to 4:4% in 2009. The increase was especially marked between
2007 and 2008, jumping from 2:0% to 5:2%. The range experienced a similar pattern. It increased
from 1:1% to 23:5% between 2000 and 2009, and from 7:2% to 27:3% between 2007 and 2008.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this is the main stylized fact of our study: the cross-sectional
variation in returns of TDFs with the same target date is substantial, and it increases in the years
immediately after the passage of the PPA.
Note that the large cross-sectional dispersion of returns does not simply reect large (in
absolute value) average TDF returns.14 Consider 2003, when 2015{2020 funds delivered an average
return of 21:7%, the third largest (in absolute value) average return of the 2000{2009 sample; the
13To facilitate comparisons between Tables 2, 3, and 4, we calculate statistics for a constant sample of funds.
Specically, to appear in Table 2, 3, or 4, we must observe the TDFs annual return, its allocation to equity, and the
12 lagged monthly returns required to estimate its CAPM beta.
14A direct relation between average returns and the cross-sectional dispersion of returns would arise if what dier-
entiates TDFs with the same target date is simply the asset allocation decision.
8cross-sectional standard deviation was only 2:8%, and the range was 5:2%. Similarly, 2025{2030
funds delivered an average return of 25:2%, but the cross-sectional standard deviation and range
were only 2:8% and 5:0%, respectively.
4.1.2 Cross-sectional dispersion in the allocation to equity
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the cross-sectional distribution of the reported fraction
of the portfolio allocated to equity. Three patterns are worth noting. First, although we are
following cross-sections of TDFs that are getting closer to their target date, there is only a slight
downward trend in the average allocation to equity. For example, for the 2015{2020 target date, the
average allocation to equity goes from 67:2% in 2000, to 63:5% in 2009, with upward and downward
uctuations over the sample period. Second, the cross-sectional dispersion in equity allocations is
substantial. In 2009, for example, the cross-sectional standard deviation was 12:1%, 13:5%, and
12:4%, for the 2005{2010, 2015{2020, and 2025{2030 target dates, respectively. Third, there is no
obvious trend in the cross-sectional standard deviation of equity allocations. This suggests that
the increasing cross-sectional dispersion of returns documented in Table 2 is driven by increasingly
diverse targeted asset allocation choices (e.g., value versus growth, and large-cap versus small-cap
equities) and individual security selections, rather than by increasing dierences in the broad asset
allocation choice|the stock versus cash and bond decision. Hence, the broad stock versus bond
allocation of a TDF does not appear to be a sucient statistic for the risk of the investment.
4.1.3 Cross-sectional dispersion of CAPM betas
We rst measure dierences in investment behavior using the CAPM beta, which is a measure of
a TDF's exposure to equity market risk. We estimate the one-factor beta in December of each
9year using monthly fund-level returns (in excess of the one-month T-bill rate from Ken French's
website) and the monthly value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (in
excess of the one-month T-bill rate).
Table 4 presents the results of the analysis. Two patterns in the table are noteworthy. First,
for all ve target dates, there is an upward trend in the average market beta. For the 2005{2010
target date TDFs, the average beta goes from 0:46 in 2000 to 0:56 in 2009; for the 2015{2020 target
date TDFs, the average beta goes from 0:61 in 2000 to 0:75 in 2009; for the 2025{2030 TDFs, the
average beta goes from 0:73 to 0:83; for the 2035{2040 TDFs, the average beta goes from 0:81 to
0:91; and for the 2045{2050 target date TDFs, the average beta goes from 0:92 in 2006 (the rst
year for which we can estimate beta) to 0:96 in 2009. These increases are noteworthy because, over
time, established TDFs should be decreasing their exposure to equity. Hence, the overall upward
trend is likely to reect the entry of new funds that oer higher exposure to equities.
Second, we observe some evidence of an increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of betas.
For the 2035{2040 target date, for example, the cross-sectional standard deviation of betas goes
from 0 in 2000 to 0:08 in 2009. More signicantly, the range of estimated betas goes from 0 to
0:38. The patterns in Table 4 suggest that entry by TDFs is both driving up the average beta, and
increasing the dispersion of betas among funds with the same target date in the same year.
4.2 Decomposition: total dispersion, market dispersion, and fund dispersion
In order to quantify the incidence of the cross-sectional dispersion on the overall dispersion of
returns, for each target date we compute two measures. First, we compute the \Total Dispersion,"










(rijt   rj)2; (1)
where rijt is a TDF's yearly return and rj is the average return across all TDFs with target date
j and all years. This is the variability of TDF returns around the overall average return for that
target date, and measures the total risk faced by investors who invest in TDFs with target date
j: in a balanced panel, this variability can be thought of as the risk faced by an investor who is
assigned randomly to a TDF at the beginning of the sample, and who stays in that TDF for the
remainder of the sample. Second, we compute the \Market Dispersion," the standard deviation
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where rjt is the year-t return on an equally-weighted portfolio of TDFs with target date j. Third,
we compute the \Fund Dispersion," the standard deviation within target date j:
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(rijt   rj)2: (3)
In a balanced panel, this is the extra risk that an investor bears because of having chosen the i-th
TDF with target date j, as opposed to an equally-weighted portfolio of TDFs with target date j.
This general approach can also used to decompose the dispersion of equity allocations and CAPM
betas. Results are presented in Table 5.
We rst focus on the variability of TDF returns. Looking across the ve samples of TDFs,
11we see that much of the risk associated with investing in TDFs comes from Market Dispersion:
Total Dispersion ranges between 16:7% and 30:0%, and Market Dispersion ranges between 16:3%
and 29:9%. However, there remains signicant Fund Dispersion. Fund Dispersion ranges from
2:7% for 2035{2040 funds to 3:8% for 2005{2010 funds, showing the surprising fact that there is
more Fund Dispersion in TDF returns when target dates are near than when they are far. By way
of comparison, we perform a similar variance decomposition on the annual returns of traditional
balanced funds and S&P 500 index funds. For balanced funds, which arguably have more discretion
over asset allocation, market timing, and security selection, Total Dispersion is 14:6% and Fund
Dispersion is 5:0%. In contrast, for S&P 500 index funds, Total Dispersion is 21:9% and Fund
Dispersion is 0:3%. Hence, TDFs in all ve samples expose investors to greater Total Dispersion
than traditional balanced funds. Perhaps more surprisingly, TDFs in three out ve samples expose
investors to greater Total Dispersion than S&P 500 index funds, which invest close to 100% in
U.S. equity. Finally, it is worth noting that the Fund Dispersion in TDFs falls between that of
dierentiated products (traditional balanced funds) and commodities (S&P 500 index funds).
Next, we turn to the equity allocation. Unlike returns, the variance decomposition in Table
5 suggests that most of the variation in the fraction allocated to equity is driven by across-fund
dierences in asset allocation. In this case, Total Dispersion ranges between 8:2% and 14:1%, and
Fund Dispersion ranges between 8:1% and 13:6%. Market Dispersion, on the other hand, only
ranges between 1:6% and 3:7%. Hence, the breakdown of the overall dispersion in TDF equity
allocations is quite comparable to that for Balanced Funds: 12:1%, 2:1%, and 11:9%, for Total
Dispersion, Market Dispersion, and Fund Dispersion, respectively.
Finally, we turn to the CAPM betas. As with equity allocations, most of the dispersion in
the equity exposure is driven by across-fund dierences in asset allocations: Total Dispersion ranges
12between 0:08 and 0:13, and Fund Dispersion ranges between 0:07 and 0:12. Market Dispersion
ranges between 0:03 and 0:06, and is always lower than Fund Dispersion. Again, this breakdown of
the overall dispersion in CAPM betas is quite comparable to that for Balanced Funds: 0:17, 0:04,
and 0:17, for Total Dispersion, Market Dispersion, and Fund Dispersion, respectively. In summary,
this analysis conrms the impression given by Tables 2{4 that the heterogeneity in TDF returns
has little to do, on average, with the heterogeneity in broad asset allocation choices.
4.3 Explaining realized returns using glide paths
It is natural to ask how much of the cross-sectional variation in returns can be explained by
heterogeneity in equity allocations, i.e., heterogeneity in glide paths. We construct benchmark
returns for each TDF based on that TDF's equity allocation and based on the returns on broad
equity and bond indices and a cash index. We consider two choices of benchmarks: the MSCI
World Index, the Barclays Global Aggregate Bond Index, and the J.P. Morgan US Cash Index;
and the S&P 500 Index, the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index, and the J.P. Morgan US Cash Index.
For each year and each target date, we run a pooled regression of the monthly TDF return rijt
on a constant and the return on the benchmark corresponding to that TDF, where both the TDF
and the benchmark returns are in deviations from the cross-sectional average for that month.15
R-squareds of the regressions are reported in Table 6. To the extent that TDFs are investing in
these indices, R-squareds should be close to one.
We nd pronounced heterogeneity in the cross-sectional R-squareds, although, across target
dates, we also see an overall upward trend. Consider the rst choice of benchmarks. The cross-
sectional R-squared is as low as 0:05% for 2035{2040 funds in 2000; and as high as 53:69% for
15This is equivalent to running a panel regression with a separate month xed eect for each target date.
132035{2040 funds in 2009. When we average across all target dates and years, we have an average
cross-sectional R-squared of 41:66%. Results are somewhat dierent, but comparable, overall, for
the second choice of benchmarks. In this case, the cross-sectional R-squared is as low as 0:07%
for 2035-2040 funds in 2000; and as high as 67:51% for 2005{2010 funds in 2006. The average
cross-sectional R-squared is 35:54% for this second choice of indices.
4.4 Regression analysis
In this section, we perform a series of regression exercises to study the determinants of the cross-
sectional dispersion in returns, the level and cross-sectional dispersion of alphas, the level of equity
allocations, and the level of fund betas.
4.4.1 Explaining the cross-sectional dispersion in monthly fund-level returns
We regress a measure of the heterogeneity of individual TDF returns on aggregate time-varying
factors, time-varying factors that are specic to a given target date, and time-varying factors that
are specic to a given TDF. We estimate the regression model:
(rijt   rjt)2 = aj + b>Xt + c>Yjt + d>Zijt + ijt; (4)
where rijt is the TDF's monthly return and rjt is the cross-sectional average of the rates of return
of TDFs with target date j in month t.
In this and in the other regression models, the Xt vector includes a linear time trend and
a post-2006 dummy variable. The Yjt vector includes the natural logarithm of the total number
of funds with target date j in month t. The Zijt vector includes four variables that allow us to
14test for dierences between the TDFs of new and established market participants: a dummy equal
to one if the fund was introduced after 2006; a dummy equal to one if the fund was introduced
after 2006 and the fund family entered the TDF market after 2006; and the fund's age in month t.
Because funds with higher expense ratios and more assets under management have been shown to
earn lower returns (e.g., Carhart, 1997, and Chen et al., 2004), the Zijt vector also includes: the
fund-level expense ratio measured in month t   1; and the natural logarithm of fund-level assets
under management in month t   1. Here and in the other regression models, we control for target
date xed eects (the intercept in (4) is target-date specic), and standard errors are clustered by
mutual fund family and month.
Table 7 presents the results from several regression specications.16 In the rst column, we
control for the linear time trend, post-2006 dummy variable, and target-date xed eects. We nd
that return dispersion jumped during the last three years of our sample. In the second column,
we add the natural logarithm of the number of funds within each target-date-by-month cell (to
measure the degree of competition) and a dummy variable that indicates whether TDFijt was
introduced in 2007, 2008, or 2009. We nd that the post-2006 eect is being driven both by an
increase in the number of competitors, and by the introduction of new TDFs. In the third column,
we distinguish between new TDFs being oered by existing market participants and new TDFs
being oered by those families that oer their rst TDF after 2006. We continue to nd that
dispersion increases with an increase in the number of competitors. Furthermore, we nd that
the new TDF eect in the second column is being driven entirely by new TDFs being oered by
families that are new to the TDF market. This is the main nding of Table 7. Notably, it survives
the addition of fund-level controls in the fourth column. In terms of economic signicance, funds
16When we re-estimate the specications in Table 7 as censored-regression models (with two-way clustering), to
allow for the fact that the dependent variable cannot be negative, we obtain quantitatively similar results.
15introduced by a family that entered the TDF market after 2006 have returns that are signicantly
dierent from the cross-sectional average: these funds have returns that deviate between 75 and
77 basis points|between 9:00% and 9:27% on an annual basis|from the target-date average more
than other new funds.17 The implication is that families entering the market pursue more volatile
investment strategies than incumbent families introducing new TDFs. Not surprisingly, the t of
the various specications is rather poor|we are essentially modeling monthly returns in deviation
from the cross-sectional average|ranging between 1:79% and 3:96%.
4.4.2 Explaining dierences in monthly fund-level alphas
The cross-sectional dispersion in TDF returns can be attributed to idiosyncratic and systematic
factors, i.e., to \alphas" and \betas." We start by investigating patterns in alphas. We estimate
the models
ijt = aj + b>Xt + d>Zijt + ijt; (5)
and
(ijt   jt)2 = aj + b>Xt + d>Zijt + ijt; (6)
where ijt is the sum of the intercept and residual from a regression of a TDF's excess return on
the excess returns on various indices: we estimate the index model with data up to month t and
then we construct the alpha going one month out of sample.18
17Because the dependent variable is the squared deviation, we estimate these eects by taking the square root of
the estimated coecients.
18We consider two specications of the index model: In the rst specication, the indices are the MSCI World
Index and the Barclays Global Aggregate Bond Index. In the second specication, the indices are the S&P 500 Index
16Results of the analysis are presented in Table 8. The main result from the table is that
funds introduced by a fund family that entered the TDF market after 2006 have alphas that are
signicantly lower than other new funds: about 16 basis points per month, or about 1:9% per
year. Moreover, these funds have alphas that deviate from the cross-sectional average more than
the other new funds: between 74 and 77 basis points per month, or between 8:86% and 9:27% per
year. As with the model of the previous section, the t of the various specications is rather poor,
ranging between 0:72% and 5:50%.
4.4.3 Explaining the allocation to equity
The second main driver of the cross-sectional dispersion in TDF returns is heterogeneity in betas
and, hence, heterogeneity in equity allocations. We estimate the model
wijt = aj + b>Xt + d>Zijt + ijt; (7)
where wijt is the fraction of a TDF's portfolio that is allocated to equity in the month of December
of each year, as reported in CRSP.19
Results of the analysis are presented in Table 9, which has the same structure as Table 7.
The main result from the table is that, while funds introduced after 2006 have lower allocations
to equities|between 2:18% and 8:80%, depending on the specication|new funds introduced by
a fund family new to the TDF market have higher allocations to equities|between 4:59% and
5:42%. This suggests that new entrants are exposing TDF investors to more market risk than
existing rms, perhaps with the goal of attracting investors who focus on raw rather than risk-
and the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index. Both specication are estimated using monthly returns over the prior 12
months. Again, returns are in excess of the one-month T-bill rate posted on Ken French's website.
19Note that the covariates measured in month t   1 are measured in November.
17adjusted performance.
4.4.4 Explaining the level of CAPM beta
We now investigate how the patterns in equity allocations documented in the previous section
translate into patterns in equity exposure. We estimate the model
^ ijt = aj + b>Xt + c>Yjt + d>Zijt + ijt; (8)
where ^ ijt is the December beta estimate, obtained by regressing monthly TDF excess returns on
the excess returns on the CRSP value-weighted index over the prior 12 months.
Results are presented in Table 10. The main result from this table mirrors the main result
from the previous table: while funds introduced after 2006 have slightly lower equity betas than
other new funds|between 0:01 and 0:07 lower, depending on the specication|new funds intro-
duced by a new fund family have slightly higher equity betas|0:03 higher. This reinforces our
earlier nding that new entrants tilt their portfolio toward equity.
5 Conclusions
We document pronounced heterogeneity in the TDF universe: TDFs with the same target date have
delivered very dierent returns to investors. This heterogeneity has increased over time, especially
after the passage of the PPA of 2006. Indeed, we can attribute the increased heterogeneity to the
entry of new mutual fund families in the TDF market during the 2007{2009 period. These patterns
are consistent with new entrants adopting a product-dierentiation strategy. Instead of oering
TDFs with the same risk prole as the TDFs oered by incumbents (and, therefore, being forced
18to compete on fees), the late entrants introduced TDFs with dierent risk proles. Moreover, if we
view the deviation of a TDF's return from the average TDF return as a measure of obfuscation,
our ndings show that increased competition leads to more obfuscation overall, and, in particular,
on the part of the new entrants in the market. Our ndings suggest that the widespread adoption
of TDFs will not necessarily equalize the returns earned by investors enrolled in dierent 401(k)
plans.
Indeed, the cross-sectional dispersion in returns of funds with 2015{2020 target dates was
so large in 2008 and 2009, that it came to the attention of regulators. On November 30, 2010,
regulation was proposed to increase investor understanding of how TDFs operate. Specically,
TDFs are required to provide: i) a description and graphical illustration of the asset allocation,
how it will change over time, and the point when it will be the most conservative; i) a clarication
of the relevance of the date (if the name includes a target date) and the target age group for which
the investment is designed; and iii) a statement that a participant is not immune from risk of loss,
even near or after retirement, and that no guarantee of sucient returns to sustain an adequate
retirement income can be given.20
The pronounced heterogeneity in TDF returns that we document means that a well-informed
410(k) investor, who is limited to the TDFs of a single mutual fund family, may face a suboptimal
set of retirement savings options. In any case, even if we assume that dierences in disclosed asset
allocations perfectly capture dierences in risk, it is still true that those investors who are the most
likely to be defaulted into TDFs|and to stay in TDFs|may be the least able to make an informed
choice between TDFs and other investment vehicles.
20DOL: EBSA Federal Register: 29 CFR Part 2550, October 20, 2010.
19Appendix: Overview of the Pension Protection Act of 2006
The PPA of 2006 amends Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, providing
reform for deferred compensation plans for highly compensated employees, for dened benet (DB)
retirement plans regarding contribution and funding requirements, and for dened contribution
(DC) retirement plans regarding catch up limits, contribution limits, and automatic enrollment
plans. With respect to the automatic enrollment feature of DC retirement plans, the PPA of
2006 relieves duciaries of liability for investment losses when they default plan participants into
QDIAs, given that they adhere to conditions specied by the DOL's Employee Benets Security
Administration (EBSA).21 However, plan sponsors and duciaries will not be relieved of liability
for the prudent selection and monitoring of a QDIA.
The PPA of 2006 was \prompted by the default in recent years of several large dened benet
pension plans and the increasing decit of Pension Benet Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)."22
The PBGC, founded in 1975, was created to insure companies with DB pension plans, providing
guarantees to employees of those companies that their pensions would be safe. Since its creation,
the PBGC faced several pension claims. However, of the ten largest pension claims against the
PBGC, nine occurred between 2001 and 2005.23 Examples of defaulting rms include: Bethlehem
Steel in 2002, for which PBGC insured approximately 95,000 pensions; National Steel in 2003, for
which PBGC insured approximately 35,000 pensions; and United Airlines in 2005, for which PBGC
assumed responsibility for approximately 134,000 pensions.
In January of 2005, a proposal regarding the funding of pensions was created, indicating
new minimum funding requirements for pension plans with the hope of strengthening the overall
21DOL: EBSA Federal Register: 29 CFR Part 2550, October 24, 2007.
22Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 23, 2006.
23Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 23, 2006.
20pension system. Later that year, major pension reform bills were proposed in the House (The
Pension Protection Act) and the Senate (The Pension Security and Transparency Act). The PPA
of 2006 resulted from negotiations between the House and the Senate conducted in March of 2006.24
The nal ruling was passed by the House on July 28, 2006, passed by the Senate on August 3, 2006,
and signed into law on August 17, 2006.
A.1 Time line of the Pension Protection Act of 2006
1. 7/28/2006 Introduced in House.
2. 7/28/2006 Passed/agreed to in House.
3. 8/3/2006 Passed in Senate without amendment by Yea-Nay Vote.
4. 8/3/2006 Cleared for White House.
5. 8/14/2006 Presented to President.
6. 8/17/2006 PPA signed by President and became public law No. 109-280.
7. 9/27/2006 DOL proposed rules regarding \Default Investment Alternatives Under Partici-
pant Directed Individual Account Plans" to dene which investment vehicles are appropriate
default investments.
8. 10/24/2007 DOL made nal ruling on regulations for the proposed rules.
9. 12/24/2007 Final rule was eective.
24Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 23, 2006.
21A.2 DC Plans and automatic enrollment: QDIAs
According to U.S. Secretary of Labor, Elaine L. Chao, the PPA of 2006 \would boost retirement
savings by establishing default investments for these workers that are appropriate for long-term
savings."25 QDIAs are those investment vehicles into which rms can default participants (who
do not actively choose their own investment vehicles) without being liable for investment losses.
QDIAs must:26
1. Be diversied to decrease probability of large losses.
2. Be managed by an investment manager/company registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940.
3. Not penalize or prevent a participant from transferring their assets from a QDIA to another
investment alternative available under the plan.
4. Not invest participant contributions directly in employer securities. Potential QDIAs include
TDFs, balanced funds, and professionally managed accounts.
A.3 Quotes summarizing advantages and disadvantages of TDFs
Source for all quotes: DOL and SEC Joint Public Hearing on TDFs and Other Similar Investment
Options: June 18, 2009.
Advantages:
 \Target date funds were expected to make investing easier for the typical American and avoid
the need for investors to constantly monitor market movements and realign their personal
25DOL: EBSA Newsroom, September 26, 2006.
26DOL: EBSA Federal Register: 29 CFR Part 2550, October 24, 2007.
22investment allocations." SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro
 \Target Date Funds are one of the most important recent innovations in retirement savings.
They provide a convenient way for an investor to purchase a mix of asset classes within a
single fund that will rebalance the asset allocation and become more conservative as the
investor ages." Karrie McMillan, general counsel of the Investment Company Institute
 \Target Date Fund investors avoid extreme asset allocations that we often observe in retire-
ment savings." Karrie McMillan, general counsel of the Investment Company Institute
 \Target date funds were designed to be easy to use and require little maintenance." Richard
Whitney, Director of Asset Allocation of T. Rowe Price
 \...the fundamental purpose of Target Date Funds is to provide investors a diversied,
prudently-managed, appropriate exposure to investment risks." John Ameriks, economist
and principal at the Vanguard Group
 \When evaluating the performance of Target date funds, it's important to acknowledge the
extreme severity of the nancial meltdown we have just experienced ...in our view they
performed as designed. In particular, in the vast majority of cases, older investors were
exposed to far less risks than younger investors and consequently suered less dramatic losses."
John Ameriks, economist and principal at the Vanguard Group
 \...it is important for investors to stay committed to a retirement savings plan. Target
Date Funds are designed to help participants maintain this discipline." Derrick Young, Chief
Investment Ocer of the Fidelity Global Asset Allocation Group
Disadvantages:
23 \While Target Date Mutual Funds currently do a good job of describing their objectives, risks
and glide paths, we do see gaps in the public understanding of Target date funds." Karrie
McMillan, general counsel of the Investment Company Institute
 \Target date funds are not designed to be riskless or to provide a guaranteed amount of
retirement income ..." John Ameriks, economist and a principal at the Vanguard Group
 \Retirees do a lot of dierent things with the money in these plans at the point of retirement,
and so there is some debate around exactly how the money is going to be used ...it's very
dicult to come up with a sort of specic answer that solves the problem for everybody."
John Ameriks, economist and a principal at the Vanguard Group
 \Challenges ...exist in getting disengaged participants to read and fully digest any informa-
tion provided to them." John Ameriks, economist and a principal at the Vanguard Group
 \We have serious concerns that these funds are fundamentally misleading to investors because
they're allowed to be managed in ways that are inconsistent with reasonable expectations that
are created by the titles and the use of the names." Marilyn Capelli-Dimitro, Chair of the
Certied Financial Planner Board of Standards
 \Appropriate disclosures are required and must be provided, but in reality, disclosures are
seldom read or understood fully despite our ongoing education of clients." Marilyn Capelli-
Dimitro, Chair of the Certied Financial Planner Board of Standards
 \When plan sponsors and participants started adopting TDFs in big meaningful numbers
starting in 2002, the race was on for performance numbers, and this is where the train went
o the track ...There is some theoretical rationale for employing a glide path through the
24accumulation phase. No credible rationale has ever been proered for using a glide path in
the distribution phase. This is what caused the unacceptably large losses in 2010 funds in
2008." Joe Nagengast, Target Date Analytics
 \...part of the concern here is when you have a fund of funds, it may become a lot easier to,
for example, hide under-performing funds in Target Date Funds, [or] hide higher fee funds
in a Target Date Fund that may not be completely appropriate." Dave Certner, Legislative
Counselor and Legislative Policy Director at AARP
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33Table 6: Explaining realized returns using glide paths
In this table, we report R2-s from pooled regressions of realized monthly returns on predicted monthly
returns, where both realized and predicted returns are in deviations from the cross-sectional average for that
month. The unit of observation is TDF i with target date j in month t. The predicted monthly return
for fund i in month t is calculated using the fund's allocations to equity, debt, and cash (as most recently
reported in CRSP), and monthly benchmark returns for each asset class. (The only TDFs that we exclude
from this analysis are those for which we do not observe the allocation to equity, debt, and cash.) In Panel
A, our benchmarks for equity and debt are the MSCI World Index and the Barclays Global Aggregate Bond
Index, respectively. In Panel B, we switch to the S&P 500 Index and the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index.
In both panels, our benchmark for cash is the J.P. Morgan US Cash Index. In most regressions, our sample
is restricted to the subset of TDFs in a single calendar year (e.g., TDFs with target dates of 2015 or 2020
that are in operation during any part of 2004).
Panel A. Predicting monthly TDF returns using international benchmarks
2005 & 2010 2015 & 2020 2025 & 2030 2035 & 2040 2045 & 2050 ALL
2000 13.08% 27.90% 35.40% 0.05% 22.66%
2001 5.30% 11.22% 16.60% 0.18% 8.46%
2002 10.21% 10.13% 9.78% 12.45% 10.25%
2003 2.14% 6.23% 21.36% 25.42% 8.89%
2004 12.58% 14.06% 30.56% 33.17% 18.05%
2005 11.09% 11.67% 15.48% 14.03% 7.56% 12.65%
2006 38.50% 45.50% 50.62% 48.52% 39.59% 44.91%
2007 39.80% 37.22% 37.30% 36.81% 42.32% 38.12%
2008 44.48% 49.07% 49.59% 45.70% 39.86% 46.22%
2009 40.29% 49.54% 52.78% 53.69% 53.28% 49.86%
ALL 35.00% 42.97% 44.95% 43.35% 43.32% 41.66%
Panel B. Predicting monthly TDF returns using domestic benchmarks
2005 & 2010 2015 & 2020 2025 & 2030 2035 & 2040 2045 & 2050 ALL
2000 39.59% 41.70% 37.31% 0.07% 35.71%
2001 35.71% 37.40% 29.57% 0.51% 32.21%
2002 60.08% 39.72% 25.72% 23.49% 35.11%
2003 28.20% 45.40% 44.87% 39.39% 39.09%
2004 64.55% 37.19% 29.98% 18.90% 31.73%
2005 58.97% 38.69% 33.95% 24.95% 9.99% 33.05%
2006 67.51% 54.61% 40.49% 33.80% 24.21% 44.86%
2007 64.93% 51.86% 38.57% 33.21% 34.31% 42.45%
2008 54.66% 45.12% 33.89% 25.43% 20.84% 34.88%
2009 65.60% 58.29% 44.48% 36.93% 34.81% 45.50%
ALL 52.44% 44.79% 34.42% 27.57% 24.25% 35.54%
34Table 7: Explaining the cross-sectional dispersion in monthly fund-level returns
The unit of observation is the TDF oered by family i with target date j in month t. The dependent variable
is (rijt   rjt)2. To calculate the dependent variable we require that there be at least two TDFs with target
date j in month t. The full set of independent variables includes: a linear time trend; a post-2006 dummy
variable; the natural logarithm of the total number of funds with target date j in month t; a dummy equal to
one if the fund was introduced after 2006; a dummy equal to one if the fund was introduced after 2006 and
the fund family entered the TDF market after 2006; the fund-level expense ratio measured in month t 1; the
natural logarithm of fund-level assets under management in month t 1; and the fund's age in month t. We
also control for target-date xed eects (i.e., 2000, 2005, ..., 2045, and 2050). The sample includes all TDFs
for which we observe the dependent and independent variables. Estimation is via OLS. Standard errors are
simultaneously clustered on mutual fund family and month. , , and  denote statistical signicance at
the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: (retijt    retjt)
2
Linear time trend 0:004  0:009  0:010  0:006
(0:004) (0:007) (0:007) (0:009)
2007, 2008, or 2009? 0:332
 0:114 0:087 0:169
(0:189) (0:171) (0:171) (0:168)
Ln Total Number of Funds 0:513
 0:548
 0:411
with TD j in month t (0:266) (0:268) (0:298)
Fund introduced after 2006? 0:488
 0:016  0:128
(0:201) (0:109) (0:144)
Fund introduced by family 0:598
 0:563

introducing TDFs after 2006? (0:234) (0:212)
Fund age measured in month t 0:010
(0:020)
Lagged expense ratio 0:196
(0:270)
Ln fund size measured  0:061
in month t   1 (0:038)
TD xed eects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard error clustering: Family & Family & Family & Family &
Month Month Month Month
N 13956 13956 13956 11534
R
2 1:79% 3:03% 3:52% 3:96%
35Table 8: Explaining dierences in monthly fund-level alphas
The unit of observation is the TDF oered by family i with target date j in month t. The dependent variable
is either the estimated monthly ijt, or the squared deviation of ijt from the equal-weighted  of TDFs
with target date j in month t. We estimate  using two dierent factor models. In model (1), the factors
are the MSCI World Index and the Barclays Global Aggregate Bond Index. In model (2), the factors are the
S&P 500 Index and the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index. We estimate both models using monthly returns
over the prior 12 months. The full set of independent variables includes: a linear time trend; a post-2006
dummy variable; the natural logarithm of the total number of funds with target date j in month t; a dummy
equal to one if the fund was introduced after 2006; a dummy equal to one if the fund was introduced after
2006 and the fund family entered the TDF market after 2006; the fund-level expense ratio measured in
month t   1; the natural logarithm of fund-level assets under management in month t   1; and the fund's
age in month t. We also control for target-date xed eects (i.e., 2000, 2005, ..., 2045, and 2050). The
sample includes all TDFs for which we observe the dependent and independent variables. Estimation is via
OLS. Standard errors are simultaneously clustered on mutual fund family and month. , , and  denote
statistical signicance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ijt (ijt    jt)
2
Factors: Global US Global US
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2)
Linear time trend  0:004 0:000  0:012
  0:013

(0:009) (0:007) (0:006) (0:006)
2007, 2008, or 2009? 0:121  0:130 0:120 0:132
(0:227) (0:124) (0:104) (0:095)
Ln Total Number of Funds 0:072 0:093 0:473
 0:522

with TD j in month t (0:342) (0:255) (0:172) (0:213)
Fund introduced after 2006? 0:212
 0:087  0:145  0:168

(0:109) (0:057) (0:090) (0:098)





introducing TDFs after 2006? (0:051) (0:039) (0:148) (0:161)
Fund age measured in month t 0:017
 0:011
 0:014 0:015
(0:007) (0:005) (0:012) (0:012)
Lagged expense ratio  0:106
  0:164
  0:037  0:060
(0:024) (0:024) (0:138) (0:132)





in month t   1 (0:004) (0:009) (0:027) (0:028)
TD xed eects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard error clustering: Family Family Family Family
& Month & Month & Month & Month
N 9732 9732 9732 9732
R
2 0:72% 1:11% 4:63% 5:50%
36Table 9: Explaining the allocation to equity
The unit of observation is the TDF oered by family i with target date j in month t, but the sample is
restricted to December 2000, December 2001, etc. The dependent variable is the fraction of the TDF's
portfolio that is allocated to equity, as reported in CRSP. The full set of independent variables includes:
a linear time trend; a post-2006 dummy variable; the natural logarithm of the total number of funds with
target date j in month t; a dummy equal to one if the fund was introduced after 2006; a dummy equal to one
if the fund was introduced after 2006 and the fund family entered the TDF market after 2006; the fund-level
expense ratio measured in month t   1; the natural logarithm of fund-level assets under management in
month t   1; and the fund's age in month t. We also control for target-date xed eects (i.e., 2000, 2005,
..., 2045, and 2050). The sample includes all TDFs for which we observe the dependent and independent
variables. Estimation is via OLS. Standard errors are simultaneously clustered on mutual fund family and
month. , , and  denote statistical signicance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Equityijt
Linear time trend  0:105  0:143
  0:138
  0:050
(0:069) (0:080) (0:077) (0:048)
2007, 2008, or 2009? 3:881 4:327 4:098 7:883

(3:893) (3:273) (3:094) (2:423)
Ln Total Number of Funds 2:156 2:136  2:743

with TD j in month t (3:235) (3:170) (0:678)




Fund introduced by family 4:591
 5:424

introducing TDFs after 2006? (2:712) (1:977)
Fund age measured in month t  1:023

(0:400)
Lagged expense ratio 2:611
(3:919)
Ln fund size measured 0:212
in month t   1 (0:451)
TD xed eects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard error clustering: Family Family Family Family
& Year & Year & Year & Year
N 1224 1224 1224 900
R
2 58:55% 58:83% 59:28% 60:92%
37Table 10: Explaining the level of CAPM Beta
The unit of observation is the TDF oered by family i with target date j in month t, but the sample is
restricted to December 2000, December 2001, etc. The dependent variable is estimated using the CRSP
value-weighted index and monthly returns over the prior 12 months. The full set of independent variables
includes: a linear time trend; a post-2006 dummy variable; the natural logarithm of the total number of
funds with target date j in month t; a dummy equal to one if the fund was introduced after 2006; a dummy
equal to one if the fund was introduced after 2006 and the fund family entered the TDF market after 2006;
the fund-level expense ratio measured in month t   1; the natural logarithm of fund-level assets under
management in month t   1; and the fund's age in month t. We also control for target-date xed eects
(i.e., 2000, 2005, ..., 2045, and 2050). The sample includes all TDFs for which we observe the dependent
and independent variables. Estimation is via OLS. Standard errors are simultaneously clustered on mutual
fund family and month. , , and  denote statistical signicance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level,
respectively.
Dependent variable: CAPM Betaijt
Linear time trend 0:002
 0:001 0:001 0:001
(0:000) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
2007, 2008, or 2009?  0:034  0:038  0:039  0:033
(0:039) (0:034) (0:034) (0:036)
Ln Total Number of Funds 0:045 0:044 0:050
with TD j in month t (0:035) (0:034) (0:033)




Fund introduced by family 0:034 0:034

introducing TDFs after 2006? (0:021) (0:018)
Fund age measured in month t  0:012

(0:004)
Lagged expense ratio 0:066
(0:045)
Ln fund size measured 0:009
in month t   1 (0:005)
TD xed eects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard error clustering: Family Family Family Family
& Month & Month & Month & Month
N 1058 1058 1058 919
R
2 67:39% 67:60% 67:75% 68:07%
38